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The Legitimation of Post-Crisis Capitalism in the United Kingdom: Real Wage Decline, 
Finance-Led Growth and the State     
Abstract 
 
Since the 2008 financial crisis, capitalist development in the UK has been marked by both 
continuity and change. Whilst the Coalition government effectively re-established the UK's 
Ǯ-ǯ  ǡ         
Labour had advanced in the pre- Ǥ      Ǯ
naǯ
consolidation. This strategy was conditional upon the deep and unprecedented period of real wage 
decline which took hold in the post-crisis conjuncture. However, the Coalition successfully 
       ǡ     Ǯ
ǯ      ǡ    ǡ   
public sector workers, on the other. Whilst this strategy secured a limited base of popular support, 
it also re-embedded a series of structural weaknesses within post-crisis UK capitalism. These 
ǯ-led growth model in the future 
and will condition British politics as the country embarks upon the process of leaving of the EU. 
 
 
Introduction   
Since the 2008 financial crisis, the UK economy moved from a phase of prolonged stagnation 
towards a putative recovery. Although steady economic growth returned in 2013, there were 
clear signs that all was not well within post-crisis UK capitalism (Green & Lavery, 2015). The 
Coalition government2  Ǯǯ
and domestic consumption and towards rising private investment and net trade (Osborne, 
2010). However, when growth returned, it was delivered through increased levels of domestic 
consumption, falling household savings and rising private debt (Berry & Hay, 2015). The 
financial ǯ           
surpass 2008 levels. For these reasons, it has been argued that the Coalition effectively re-
established the dysfunctional Ǯfinance-ledǯ growth model which had been in place throughout 
the pre-crisis conjuncture (Gamble, 2015; Hay, 2013a, p. 81; Montgomerie & Büdenbender, 
2015).3  
Amidst this continuity, there has also been a discernible shift in the ways in which post-
crisis UK capitalism has been sustained and legitimised by policymakers. Drawing on Bob 
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ǯǯ Ȃ and in particular on his distinction between Ǯ Nationǯ  Ǯ ǯ  Ȃ the article argues that the Coalition deployed a 
distinctive legitimation strategy in the post-crisis conjuncture (Jessop et al., 1988; Jessop, 
1990).5 Whilst the Coalition effectively re-established the conditions for a renewed wave of 
finance-led growth in the UK, it broke with the legitimation strategy which New Labour had 
deployed in the pre-crisis conjuncture. New Labour had advanced a distinctive Ǯ ǯ 
legitimation strategy which attempted to build a popular base of support through increasing 
spending on public services and by engaging in limited forms of redistribution.7 In contrast, the 
Coalition advanced a qualitatively distinct Ǯ ǯ   which sought to 
secure a base of support by constructing    Ǯ ǯ between two 
distinct sets of social groups: workers/welfare claimants on the one hand and private/public 
sector workers on the other. Crucially, the deep and unprecedented period of real wage decline 
which occurred between 2008 and 2015 in the UK created the conditions which allowed for the 
mobilisation of this ǮǯǤ8 This allowed the Coalition to transform 
a potential liability Ȃ deep real wage decline and the attendant drop in UK living standards Ȃ 
into a political asset, deploying this distributional shift in order to justify a series of regressive 
interventions into the UKǯsystem.   
This argument is substantiated empirically through an analysis of welfare restructuring 
and public sector retrenchment under the Coalition. In the immediate aftermath of the 2008 
crisis, the incomes of wage earners declined more rapidly than the incomes of out-of-work 
households. The Coalition exploited this novel distributional context in order to mobilise       ǡ     Ǯǯ  Ǯǯ  Ǯ ǯǤ   me time, public sector pay 
growth was (temporarily) protected relative to pay growth in the private sector. The Coalition 
exploited this novel distributional context in order to mobilise support for sustained rounds of 
public sector employment retrenchment and pay cuts. In both cases, the Coalition advanced a Ǯǯpopular base of support 
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for its political programme. However, this strategy also re-embedded a series of structural 
weaknesses9 at the heart of post-crisis UK capitalism.   
The argument proceeds as follows. Section One advances a distinctive account of the 
relation between distribution, legitimation and the state, focussing on the ways in which 
policymakers can actively shape and discursively construct underlying distributional processes 
in order to build support for a given political programme. Section Two argues that New Labour   Ǯǯ    in the pre-crisis 
period which Ǯ-ǯǮǯ. 
Section Three turns to the post-crisis conjuncture and argues that whilst the Coalition 
effectively re-established the UKǯ -led growth model, it simultaneously deployed a  Ǯ ǯ   in office. This strategy attempted to secure a 
popular base of       Ǯ ǯ 
workers/welfare recipients and private/public sector workers. In this way, the Coalition 
transformed a potential liability Ȃ the ǯ unprecedented decline in real wages Ȃ into a political 
asset. The final section concludes, highlighting some of the implications of the analysis for future 
research into post-crisis capitalist development in the UK and further afield.   
Distribution, Legitimation Strategies and the State      
Within advanced capitalist societies, policymakers13 at the peak of the executive and 
legislative branches of the state apparatus are driven to secure the conditions for continued 
accumulation and legitimation over time ȋǡ  ? ? ? ?Ǣ ǡ  ? ? ? ?Ǣ ǯǡ  ? ? ? ?Ȍ.14 If 
these conditions are not established, threats to the prevailing social and economic order are 
likely to emerge. However, neither of these outcomes emerges Ǯǯ as the result of ǡ Ǯǯ . State managers play a key strategic role in securing both 
economic growth and the legitimation of the prevailing social order. As Jessop argued in his 
earlier work, a useful analytical distinction between different forms of state intervention can be 
drawn in this regard. Accumulation strategies refer to attempts by policymakers to privilege 
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certain economic sectors, subjectivities and patterns of development over others (Jessop, 1990, 
p. 198). Legitimation strategies, on the other hand, refer to more comprehensive programmes 
oriented towards securing a popular base of support within society.  
A legitimation strategy can be defined as a relatively coherent and integrated governing 
programme which seeks to secure a base of popular support within society (Gamble, 1988, p. 1; 
Gramsci, 1971). Such programmes attempt to mobilise a base of popular support by ǮǯǤǮǯ          
(Jessop, 1990). Through the dissemination and cultivation of Ǯ ǯ ǡ
policymakers can seek to build support for their favoured programme of development.15 
Similarly, governments can channel resources to strategically significant sections of the social 
base in order to integrate subordinate groups into their governing programme. Therefore, 
growth models which might otherwise exclude large swathes of the population can be flanked 
by discretionary forms of redistribution which serve to (partially) incorporate subordinate 
social groups and stabilise capitalist development.   
The question of distribution lies at the heart of legitimation strategies. However, the ǯ    distributional agent is curiously absent      ǯ
political economy and in particular within those accounts which ǯǮ-ǯ   (Crouch, 2009; Hay, 2013b; Montgomerie & Büdenbender, 2015; 
Watson, 2010, p. 415). This omission is perhaps surprising. After all, the core dynamic ǯ Ǯprivatised Keynesianismǯ Ȃ the expansion of private debt as a 
substitute for real wage growth Ȃ is at its core a distributional claim (Crouch, 2009; Hay, 2013b). ǡ        ǯ     
largely functionalist terms. Government policy is presented as bringing about the conditions for 
finance-led expansion, for example through liberalising capital markets or through 
implementing counter-Ǥǯitself as a site of distributional 
5 
 
agency Ȃ exemplified by its capacity to impose tax liabilities or to expand public expenditure Ȃ is 
not itself explicitly theorised within the growth model perspective.   
ǯ
from the economy (Jessop, 1990). Within advanced capitalist societies, there exist socially 
determined and legally codified limits on the legitimate scope of government intervention ǮǯǤessence 
a Ǯtax stateǯ ȋ
ǡ ? ? ? ?Ǣǯǡ ? ? ? ?Ȍ. If it is to perform its core functions Ȃ for example 
to maintain social order or to provide basic services Ȃ it must ensure that the conditions for 
continued taxable economic activity are in place (Gough, 1985). Consequently, government 
policies are likely to be strongly shaped by the preferences of business (Block, 1981; Przeworski, 
2014). At the same time, state managers must also navigate the social and political demands of 
strategically significant social groups, represented for example by entrenched welfare coalitions 
or by powerful electoral constituencies. The capitalist state is therefore not contingently 
implicated within distributional processes. The capitalist state is necessarily a distributional 
state, driven to relentlessly engage in forms of intervention which privilege certain social 
groups and economic fractions whilst imposing costs on others.     
State managers can attempt to secure legitimation through two key mechanisms: 
through actively shaping and discursively constructing distributional processes. Policymakers 
can actively shape distributional processes by exercising core macroeconomic policy functions. ǯǡ
and to target strategically significant social groups through discretionary expenditure 
programmes together represent crucial mechanisms through which governing legitimacy can be 
secured. For example, in a context of economic growth, policymakers can choose to cut taxes or 
increase public expenditure in order to bolster their base of support.17 In addition, policymakers 
can discursively construct underlying distributional trends in order to secure a base of popular 
support. Capitalist expansion involves the constant disruption of established social and 
6 
 
distributional relations (Peck et al., 2013; Polanyi, 2001). However, these reconfigurations do 
not independently produce patterns of social and political change; they must be interpreted and 
acted upon by social agents (Hay, 2016, p. 528). Policymakers within the Ǯǯ executive and 
legislative branches of the state play a crucial role in this regard, insofar as they are well-placed 
to construct and give political meaning to underlying distributional processes in ways which 
advance their own strategic objectives (Hay, 2014).  
  ǯ position as a site of distributional agency gives rise to two Ǯideal typicalǯ 
forms of legitimation strategy, originally identified by Jessop in his early work on Thatcherism 
(Jessop, et al., 1988; Jessop, 2002)ǤǡǮǯǤǮǯ
through channelling Ǯmaterial concessionsǯ and Ǯsymbolic rewardsǯ to the social base (Jessop et 
al., 1988, p. 168; Jessop, 1990, p. 207)Ǥ  ǡ Ǯ ǯ   - of 
which Thatcherism was a leading example - Ǯǯ(Jessop, 
2016). Projects of this form seek to secure the support of strategically significant sections of the Ǯǯ
the retrenchment of the position of a subordinate Ǯǯ. As such, Ǯtwo nationsǯ legitimation 
strategies seek to discursively construct Ǯǯ
privileged and subordinate groups.  
ǮǯǮǯlegitimation strategies provides 
us with a useful analytical device through which to interrogate processes of continuity and 
change within advanced capitalist societies. However, it is necessary to offer a number of 
qualifications to the concept before proceeding to the empirical analysis. 
 First, policymakers (at least within the modern democratic state form) are typically ǮǯǮǯǢ 
economic policy interventions necessarily involve the privileging of some social groups over 
others.19 As such, evidence of both Ǯ ǯ  Ǯ ǯ   likely to be 
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found across all advanced capitalist social orders. The predominance of one legitimation 
strategy over another can be established only through concrete empirical research.  
Second, the concept of a legitimation strategy should be distinguished from the 
narrower concept of an electoral strategy.     Ǯǯ ǡ ǯ
attempts to secure re-election can strongly condition the content of their economic policies 
(Gamble, 2014a; Griffiths, 2015; Heppell & Seawright, 2012). However, this attentiveness to the 
link between electoral strategy and economic policy tends to focus on short-termǡ Ǯ-to-ǯ
political manoeuvrings. In contrast, the concept of a legitimation strategy seeks to capture how 
the strategic orientation of state managers is conditioned by underlying, longer-term 
distributional trends. For example, as shall be argued subsequently, the unprecedented decline 
in real wages between 2008 and 2015 produced a context within which the Coalition could 
justify sustained cuts to welfare payments and public sector pay and employment.20 In contrast Ǯǯǡǡthe legitimation strategy concept seeks to uncover the ways in 
which underlying, longer-term distributional dynamics interact with and can shape state 
strategy over relatively prolonged periods.  
The legitimation strategy concept therefore operates at both an abstract and more 
concrete level of analysis. At the more abstract level, it seeks to capture the relation between 
distribution, legitimation and the state. It abstracts from the daily tactical manoeuvres made by 
policymakers and seeks, instead, to establish the ways in which recurrent Ǯpatternsǯ of state 
intervention oriented towards securing legitimation can emerge and assume a relatively 
coherent form over time. The claim is not that policymakers work with a pre-given legitimation 
strategy that functions as a kind of pre-planned Ǯǯ ǤAd hoc manoeuvrings and 
short-term tactical Ǯfixesǯ are always evident within ǯ interventions. Nonetheless, 
underlying distributional shifts can give rise to distinctive strategic orientations which can in 
turn become an embedded feature of the political landscape. These recurrent patterns of state            Ǥ  ǮOne 
8 
 ǯȀǮǯ
we can distinguish Ȃ in necessarily broad terms Ȃ   Ǯǯ  
legitimation strategies across different phases of capitalist development.   
In more concrete terms, the legitimation strategy concept can be operationalised by 
focussing on the ways in which policymakers seek to actively shape and discursively construct 
distributional processes in order to secure a base of popular support within different historical 
conjunctures.     ǯ   being embedded 
within and conditioned by underlying, longer-term distributional shifts. The remainder of this 
article ǯ with this in 
mind. In particular, it outlines the ways in which a sustained period of real wage decline 
throughout the post-crisis conjuncture created a context whereby the Coalition could attempt to 
secure a popular base of support by entrenching a series of Ǯǯ
distinct social groups.         
ǯǮǯ 
In the pre-crisis conjunctureǡ      Ǯǯ regime of 
social and economic development within the UK. On the one hand, New Labour advanced a 
finance-led accumulation strategy. The Blair and Brown governments actively privileged the 
preferences of international creditor institutions and encouraged financialised patterns of 
economic expansion (Brassett, et al; Green & Hay, 2015)Ǥ ǯ Ǯǯ Ǯǯ
UK citizens (Brassett et al., 2009; Talani, 2012). Financial services emerged as a key driver of 
growth and a crucial source of tax revenue for the Treasury in this periodǡǯ
surplus rising from £8.7 billion to £25.1 billion between 1996 and 2006 (Shaw, 2012, p. 231). 
Bank balance sheets tripled between 2000 and 2006 whilst the UK sustained the highest level of 
private debt amongst the advanced economies (Thompson, 2013, p. 477).  
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  ǯ programme was simultaneously organised around a distinctive Ȃ albeit 
imperfect and limited - Ǯ ǯ  Ǥ This strategy sought to secure and ǯ
base through public expenditure increases and targeted fiscal interventions.21 From the March 
2000 Budget onwards, the Labour Chancellor Gordon Brown began to increase spending on 
public services substantially. Between 2000 and 2005, New Labour increased real terms 
spending by 8.1% per year on the NHS and 6.1% per year on education (Tomlinson, 2012: 210; 
see also: Hindmoor, 2004: 106). This legitimation strategy was driven by a range of political 
considerations, including internal party pressures, electoral calculations and a residual 
commitment to some redistributivist social goals.   
 ǯ Ǯ ǯ   rved to incorporate social groups 
who might otherwise have been relatively excluded from the dominant finance-led growth Ǥǯ
pre-crisis conjuncture. Public sector employment increased by 700,000 throughout the New 
Labour period (Cribb et al., 2014: 7). At the same time, 57 per cent of net job creation was 
concentrated in sectors which were in large part or wholly dependent upon public funding 
(Buchanan et al., 2009: 16)ǤǮ-ǯ
ex-industrial regions, where autonomous private sector job creation was particularly weak 
(Tomlinson, 2012a, 2012b). For example, in the North East of England, 73.1 per cent of net job 
creation was in the state or para-state sectors, whilst in the West Midlands the figure was 179 
per cent as autonomous private sector employment effectively contracted (Ertürk et al., 2011: 
11). This expansion of public expenditure and state-led employment was paralleled by a range 
of redistributive social policies which channelled resources to low-to-middle income 
households (Corry, 2011: 132; Gamble & Kelly, 2001: 181). These policies played a key role in 
reducing child poverty and contained (to a limited extent) inequality growth relative to the 
previous Conservative government (Sefton et al. 2009: 44). The UKǯ-led growth model 
therefore developed in combination with a legitimation strategy which sanctioned a sustained 
10 
 
expansion of spending on public services, driven primarily by large increases in the health, 
education and transport budgets (Chote et al., 2010, p. 1). For example, between 1997 and 2008, 
real terms spending on the NHS increased by 6.3 per cent per annum and spending on education 
increased by 4.3 per cent on average (Smith 2014: 605). This represented the largest increase in 
spending on services of any peacetime UK government (Tomlinson, 2012b, p. 210).  
ǯǮǯ-crisis 
UK capitalism. The state did not simply facilitate financialisation processes in line with a Ǯ-ǯ  . It was also oriented towards securing popular support 
through actively shaping distributional processes. This resulted in a recycling of resources to 
subordinate social groups who might otherwise have been excluded from the dominant 
financialised growth model. However, the 2008 crisis undermined this hybrid regime of 
development. As tax revenues declined and the budget deficit rapidly appreciated, the 
mechanisms which had temporarily and provisionally stabilised pre-crisis capitalism came 
under intense pressure. The phase which followed Ȃ the post-crisis conjuncture Ȃ saw the 
Coalition government effectively re-establish the UKǯ-led growth model. However, this 
period also involved a qualitative shift to a new legitimation strategy which would re-embed a 
series of structural weaknesses within the emergent framework of post-crisis UK capitalism.     
ǯǮTwo NǯLegitimation strategy  
When David Cameron assumed the Conservative Party leadership in 2005, he initiated a Ǯǯin order to overcome the perception that the Conservatives were unfit 
for office (Dommett, 2015). Between 2005 and 2007, the Conservative leadership pursued a 
strategy of policy emulation which aimed ǯpolicy 
platform into  ǯ  (McAnulla, 2010). A key dimension of this strategy 
was to counter claims that the Conservatives would neglect key public services and cut public 
expenditure (Gamble, 2012, p. 62). At the 2006 Party conference, Osborne tackled tax-cutting       ǡ  ǡ ǲe will never [win the argument on the 
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economy] if people believe our tax policy comes at the expense of their public servicesǥto those ǡǣǳ(Osborne, 2006). 
In accordance with this ǡ    ? ? ? ?     ǯ
spending plans for the subsequent three years (Barker, 2007). As such, in the first two years of 
the Cameron opposition, the Conservative Party incorporated key elements of New LabourǯǮ ǯ  Ȃ at least insofar as this was exemplified by its commitment to 
increasing expenditure on public services Ȃ into its own political programme.     
  As documented within the UK political studies literature, the 2008 crisis generated a 
marked reorientation in the Conservative ǯ political and economic strategy (Dorey & 
Garnett, 2012; Gamble, 2010; Hay, 2010; Kerr et al., 2011, p. 200; McAnulla, 2010). Conscious  ǯ economic credibility had been threatened by the 2008 crisis, Osborne and 
Cameron quickly abandoned the   Ǯ ǯ in favour of a strategy of 
differentiation from the incumbent Labour government (Dorey, 2009: 266). The key shift took 
place in November 2008, when ǯ Ǯǯ
package on the grounds that it would add unacceptably to the public debt and deficit (McAnulla, 
2010: 291). Subsequently, the Conservatives ǮǯǮǯǯǡ
arguing that the severe economic downturn had been caused by reckless borrowing and 
spending by profligate Labour budgets (Hay, 2013). This narrative increasingly assumed the 
core organising principle of Conservative strategy in both opposition and subsequently in 
government (Gamble, 2014a). However, whilst this    ǯ  Ǯǯ     ǡ       
legitimation strategy which the Party leadership could deploy in office. 
 The Conservatives came to power as senior partners in a Coalition government with the 
Liberal Democrats after the May 2010 general electionǤ 	  ǡ  ǯ
economic strategy was dominated by the Conservative leadership (Bale, 2011: 6; Gamble, 2012: 
64). In the first year of the new parliament, the Chancellor Osborne outlined how he planned to 
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rejuvenate the UKǯǤlf two key objectives. First, in his June 2010 
Budget he promised to eliminate the budget deficit within one parliament (HM Treasury, 
2010a)Ǥǡ Ǯǯ UK economy: to move the UKǯ
away from its reliance on consumption and debt-fuelled growth and to establish a new growth 
model, based on exports, increased savings and private investment (Osborne, 2010). However, 
by the end of the parliament, neither of these objectives had been achieved (Berry & Hay, 2015; 
Lee, 2015). Instead, the Coalition effectively re-Ǯ-ǯ
had been in place throughout the pre-crisis conjuncture (Gamble, 2012: 73, 2014: 14; Grimshaw, 
2013; Hay, 2013a). Real wage repression not only continued but intensified, with real wages 
declining by 8 per cent between 2008 and 2014.22 At the same time, asset-price inflation 
continued, sustained by low interest rates, successive rounds of Quantitative Easing (QE) and 
through the deployment of  Ǯǯ (Green & Lavery, 
2015; Schwartz, 2015: 44). In a context of deep real wage decline, loose monetary policy and 
declining savings rates, it was calculated that household debt-to-income ratios were set to 
surpass their pre-crisis peak by 2019 (OBR, 2015: 73). Ǯ   ǯ
emerged in the UK - with all the deleterious consequences which that entailed (Hay, 2013a, p. 
81).  
 However, this underlying continuity was paralleled by a distinctive shift in the 
legitimation strategy deployed by the Coalition in office. In the June 2010 Budget, the 
Conservatives Ȃ with the assent of their coalition partners, the Liberal Democrats Ȃ began to 
implement a large austerity programme. Spending cuts as opposed to tax increases accounted 
for 77 per cent of deficit reduction (Gamble, 2014; HM Treasury, 2010a: 15). The envisioned 
scale of the fiscal consolidation was larger than any other programme of fiscal retrenchment in 
modern UK history (Ferry & Eckersley, 2012: 21; Lee, 2011b: 21). Even the NHS, which was 
protected relative to other departments, saw the tightest squeeze on its real terms budget since 
the 1950s (Lee, 2011a: 15). The majority of government departments faced cuts of 19 per cent 
over the following four years which implied that Ǯpublic service spending [would decline] 
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rapidly as a share of national income, falling from 31.7% in 2009Ȃ10 back to 25.6% of national  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǯ (Crawford et al., 2011a: 135).  
  ǯ  strategy was not without its risks. Large-scale fiscal 
consolidation ensured that the Coalition was committed to an economic programme which 
ostensibly imposed large losses on broad swathes of the population (Stanley, 2016: 2). The key 
political question for the Coalition was therefore how it might sustain a base of support whilst 
simultaneously reducing the incomes of large swathes of the population. As shall be argued ǡ  ǯ          Ǯ ǯ imation strategy. Crucially, this strategy sought to transform the 
sustained decline in real wages from a potential liability into a political asset, utilising this 
deflationary context in order to cultivate Ǯǯ in relation to two 
social groups in particular: working age welfare claimants and public sector workers.    
Workers and Working Age Welfare Recipients 
Spending on welfare typically accounts for approximately 30 per cent of public 
expenditure in the UK (IFS, 2014c).23 From the beginning of the parliament, the Coalition placed 
reducing the size of the welfare bill at the centre of its deficit reduction programme.24 The 
principal area of welfare which became earmarked for cuts was working age benefits (Cameron, 
2012).25  ǯ Ǯ ǯ        
deflationary economic programme by passing the burden of retrenchment onto this social 
group. The context of sustained real wage stagnation was crucial to the emergence of this 
strategy. As outlined in Figure 1, between 2007 and 2013, income inequality fell in the UK. This 
was the lowest level of income inequality recorded Ȃ at least on the gini measure Ȃ in the UK for 
over two decades (IFS, 2014a: 34).27. 
[FIGURE 1 HERE]   
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Real wage decline was a key driver of this drop in income inequality.   ? ? ? ?ǡ Ǯ-ǯ ?
and sustained real wage cuts across the income distribution. As a result, inequality measured in    Ǯ ǯ Ȃ the distribution of income between those who derive their 
income from employment, self-employment and capital Ȃ did increase in the first three years of 
the downturn (Exell, 2013). However, during this same period the income of non-working 
households remained relatively protected, largely because welfare payments are indexed to  Ǯǯ (IFS, 2014b: 3). As 
the income of non-working households fell less rapidly than the incomes of in-work households, 
this led to a decline in the overall level of income inequality between 2008 and 2013 (Lupton et 
al., 2015: 49).  
This dynamic was of considerable political utility to the Coalition in the debate over 
austerity in the UK. The government Ȃ sensitive to opposition charges that its policies had ǮǯȂ argued that the fall in income inequality was proof that the 
burden of its austerity programme had been shared equitably across society.28 However, there 
was a profound irony at the heart of this narrative (SPERI, 2015: 5 Ȃ 7). As of April 2013 the 
pace of cuts to benefits and tax credits was substantially accelerated as the provisions of the 
Welfare Reform Act (2012) came into effect (HM Government, 2012). This legislation 
introduced a number of reforms which disproportionately reduced the living standards of lower Ǥ	ǡǮǯ
benefits that working age households could claim (Hamnett, 2014). However, households in the Ǯǯǡ
which meant that the cap disproportionately targeted benefits claimed by the least well off.29 In 
addition, Osborne announced that most working age benefits and tax credits would be up-rated 
by one per cent (below inflation) for the three years from April 2013 to April 2016, a measure 
which was estimated to achieve savings of £1.7 billion (IFS, 2014a: 9). Again, this had a 
disproportionate impact on households at the lower end of the income distribution who were 
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more reliant on social security payments (ibid: 33). The tax and benefit changes implemented 
between April 2013 and April 2015 therefore had a clearly regressive impact, such that 
households in the bottom four income deciles experienced a net loss to their incomes, whilst 
households in the upper deciles saw their incomes protected in both absolute and relative terms 
(IFS, 2014c: 54).  
The tension in the Cǯ narrative was clear: on the one hand, the government ǮǯǢ
at the same time, through its programme of benefit and tax credit cuts, it set about actively 
dismantling the very mechanisms which had produced this (small) reduction in inequality in the 
first place. As a result, the initial drop in income inequality which occurred after the crisis began 
to go into reverse.30 ǯere taken into account, net 
household income inequality as well as relative and absolute poverty were all projected to 
increase substantially by 2020 (Brewer et al., 2012). 
In one sense, the temporary decline in income inequality between 2008 and 2013 was 
driven by structural factors: real wages declined as economic activity dried-up whilst the path 
dependent nature of inflation-indexed welfare provision (temporarily) protected the incomes of 
those at the lower end of the income distribution. However, these broader distributional shifts 
do not of themselves produce political outcomes. Rather, these processes are always mediated 
by social actors who interpret and construct responses to these broader changes (Hay, 2002).    Ǯǯ executive and legislative branches of the state have a 
privileged position in this regard insofar as they can deploy the power of the governmental 
apparatus to set the legislative agenda and to advance particular constructions of underlying 
distributional shifts. It is here, in the interpretation and construction of post-crisis distributional 
trends, where we          Ǯ ǯ
legitimation strategy under the Coalition.    
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In justifying their welfare reforms, the Coalition drew-upon a long-standing distinction ǮǯǮǯȋǡǡǮǯ ǤǤǮǯȌ (Garthwaite, 2011; Hills, 2014; Valentine & Harris, 2014). For example, the White 
Paper 21st Century Welfare, stated that, Ǯany reforms should...establish a fairer relationship 
between the people who receive benefits and the people who pay for themǯ (DWP, 2010: 5). 
Similarly, in 2012, Osborne stated that, Ǯit's unfair that when that [working] person leaves their 
home early in the morning, they pull the door behind them, they're going off to do their job, 
they're looking at their next-door neighbour, the blinds are down, and that family is living a life 
on benefits. That is unfair...and we are going to tackle that as part of tackling this country's 
economic problemsǯ (Eaton, 2012).      Ǯǯ Ǯǯhas a long pedigree in Conservative thought and governing practice (Evans, 
1997: 607; Hickson, 2009: 351)Ǥǡǯ
more than just an abstract appeal to traditional anti-welfarist principles. It also involved 
narrating its particular interventions in terms of the context of sustained real wage decline 
which had emerged in the post-crisis period.  
In January 2013, the Coalition aimed to drive its Welfare Benefits Up-Rating Bill (2013)  Ǥ        Ǯǯ   ?      
benefits which working age households could claim over a three year period. The goal was to 
achieve savings of £270 million per annum from 2014-15 onwards. However, crucially, the 
Coalition did not only justify this on the grounds that it would contribute to deficit reduction.           Ǯǯ      Ǯtanding up for hard working familiesǯ (Tepe-Belfrage, 2015), arguing 
that in a context of falling wages it was unfair that unemployed households should receive more 
than in-work households. As the Labour Party voted against the measures, the Conservatives   Ǯǯǡ
making the point that Labour were Ǯvoting to increase beǯǯ 
(Conservative Home, 2013).  
17 
  ǯ            Ǯ ǯ     ȋǮǯȌ  
marginalised group (benefit claimants). This social cleavage was relentlessly exploited by the 
Coalition. For example, the Department for Work and Pensions impact assessment stressed that 
as a result of the uprating policy, Ǯworkless households will no longer receive more in benefits 
than the average weekly wage received by families in workǯ (DWP, 2012). Iain Duncan Smith Ȃ 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions Ȃ justified the policy in similar terms by claiming that, Ǯfor too many people, it pays more to languish on benefits than to enter work... [the policy would 
therefore ensure] fairness to those who work hard and pay into the system in the processǯ 
(Smith, 2013).  
The sustained decline in real wages since 2008 formed the crucial precondition of this Ǯ ǯ  Ǥ       Ǯǯ  Ǯ ǯǡ     potential liability Ȃ the steep    ǯ  ds Ȃ into a political asset, mobilising support for 
retrenchment whilst deflecting blame for the failures of its own economic programme. Duncan 
Smith explicitly appealed to the sustained drop in ǯ wages in order to justify and build 
support for his departmǯ below-inflation Ǯǯ: 
ǲǡ
gap has grown between what people in employment have been 
getting and what people on welfare have been getting Ȃ those in work 
seeing incomes rise half as quick as those on benefits. This is not fair, 
particular for taxpayers. Under the last government they saw taxes 
rise, they saw spending rise, they saw borrowing rise and they have 
left that for the next generation. They think helping people is about 
trapping more and more people in benefits. 
(Duncan Smith, cited in: Hall, 2013) 
This juxtaposition o Ǯ  ǯ  Ǯwelfare claimantsǯ is evident 
throughout Coalition attempts to build popular support for its welfare retrenchment 
programme. In his 2012 Autumn Statement, for example, Osborne defended the benefits 
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uprating bill on the grounds that, ǲ
gets for being in workǥtoday we have helped working peopleǳ (Osborne, 2012).  
However, t ǯ    Ǯ ǯ  ǮǯȋȌ Ǯǯ
retrenchment programme. The effect of the welfare cap was to reduce the incomes of 9.5 million 
households. Of these only 2.5 million were out-of-work; 7 million of the affected households 
were in fact in low-paid employment (Mason, 2013). Despite this, tǯ Ǯǯ
legitimation strategy in the field of welfare retrenchment was successful. For example, by a 
three-to-one majority, the public (incorrectly) thought that the benefit cap would primarily hit 
the unemployed as opposed to low-paid workers (TUC, 2013a). In encouraging identification ȋȌǮǯǡCoalition successfully 
secured broad-based support for a policy which might otherwise have failed. Partly as a result 
of this, on the eve of passing the legislation, 74 per cent of the population were in favour of the 
cap as opposed to 11 per cent who were against it (YouGov, 2013). The Coalition had 
successfully transformed the potential liability of sustained real wage decline into a political 
asset, discursively constructing this underlying distributional shift so as to bolster popular 
support for a welfare retrenchment programme which imposed cuts on the incomes of both in-
work and out-of-work households.   
Private Sector and Public Sector Workers  
Under New Labour, spending on public services increased rapidly throughout the pre-
crisis conjuncture, such that public sector employment increased by 700,000 between 2000 and 
2010 (Cribb, et al., 2014)Ǥǡǯ
cuts of 19 per cent across non-protected departments (Ferry & Eckersley, 2012: 17). Since 
wages account for approximately 30 per cent of all general government expenditure, one of the 
key tasks for government departments was to cut to the size of their wage bills (Bozio & Disney, 
2011: 163). The Coalition aimed to secure this through three principal mechanisms: through 
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wage cuts, public sector pensions reform and through large scale redundancies (Bach & 
Stroleny, 2013: 345). An economic crisis which had originated within the banking sector was 
thereby reconstituted as a fiscal crisis of the state, with a significant portion of the burden of 
adjustment passed on to those working within the public sector (Burnham, 2011; Gamble, 2012: 
61).   
 ǯ            Ǯ ǯ  Ǥ     ? ? ? ?   
predicted that 490,000 jobs would go in the public sector by 2014-15 in order to save £3.3 
billion by the end of the parliament (Exell, 2010: 29; Grimshaw, 2013). However, less than two    ǯ   ǡ  ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ?      
been implemented (Grimshaw, 2013). By 2013, the OBR projected a net loss of one million 
public sector jobs between 2011 and 2019 as the public spending squeeze was extended into 
the following parliament (OBR, 2013: 75). This represented a cut to general government 
employment which was Ǯthree times as large as those delivered in the early 1990s, and 
unprecedented in at least the last 50 yearsǯ (Cribb et al., 2014: 36).  
The Coalition was clear that its objective was to reduce the size of the public sector 
workforce. On the eve of the 2010 general election, Cameron stated, Ǯin some parts of the 
country the state accounts for a bigger share of the economy than it did in the communist 
countries in the old eastern bloc. This is clearly unsustainableǯ (BBC News, 2010). The task of 
implementing mass public sector redundancies and a decade-long period of pay constraint was 
not presented merely as an unavoidable or regrettable result of deficit reduction. Rather, 
reducing the size of the public sector workforce was presented as a core element of the ǯǮǯ(Osborne, 2010). 
Accordingly, opponents of the policy - in particular the large public sector trade unions - were    Ǯǯ      Ǥ  
were clear that any public sector recalcitrance would be dealt with ruthlessly. For example, 
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Oliver Letwin31 outlined the way in which the Coalition would utilise the state in order to ǯǤ

2011, he said that it was necessary for Ǯfear and disciplineǯ to be instilled into public sector 
employees in order to drive up productivity rates. He added that large scale public sector 
redundancies would be an Ǯinevitable and intended consequenceǯ of government policy (Boffey, 
2011). Partly as a result of this strategy, by 2014 public sector workers had experienced a real 
terms pay cut of £2,245 relative to 2010 (TUC, 2014). However, when trade unions formulated a 
response to this unprecedented decline in real wages, the Chancellor immediately presented 
them as acting against th Ǯ ǯǤ For example, in 2011, in response to mounting 
threat of public sector strikes, Osborne ǯǡǮ      Ǥ         ey are 
damaging our economy at a time like this Ȃ ǯ(Osborne, 2011). 
 ǯ     therefore relied upon tackling  Ǯǯ    Ǥ ǡ   construction of underlying 
distributional trends and the cultivation of Ǯsǯ
sector workers lay at the centre of this strategy. Between 2008 and 2010, nominal public sector 
pay rose by 4.5 per cent whilst nominal private sector pay rose by only 1 per cent (Cribb et al., 
2014: 1). This had occurred because Ǯmany public sector workers, including teachers, NHS 
workers and the police, [were] subject to three-year settlements from 2008 through to 2011. 
These settlements were made shortly after the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review, before 
the recession happened and before it was known that private sector earnings would stop 
growingǯ (Cribb et al., 2014: 5). However, since real wages in the private sector declined so 
rapidly in the immediate post-crisis period, this meant that public sector pay packets were 
protected in relative terms (Bozio & Disney, 2011: 163).  
This (temporary) period of differential pay growth across the public and private sectors 
was utilised by the Coalition in order to justify a sustained period of public sector pay 
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retrenchment (Bach & Stroleny, 2013: 348).33 For example, when the Chancellor announced that 
public sector pay increases would be limited to 1 per cent over three years in the 2011 Autumn 
Statement, he drew attention to the fact that, Ǯpublic sector pay has risen at twice the rate of 
private sector pay over the last four yearsǯ. He then stated that, Ǯwhile I accept that a 1% average 
rise is tough; it is also fair to those who work to pay the taxes that will fund itǯ (Osborne, 2011). 	ǡǮǯǯ fiscal problems. 
For example, in his 2014 Autumn Statement, Osborne acknowledged that public sector pay 
freezes had delivered £12 billion of savings over the parliament. However, he went on to note ǡǲect to deliver commensurate savings in ǳ(Osborne, 2014a). 
 A large number of factors had contributed to real wage decline in the post-crisis period. 
For example, 77 per cent of net job creation between 2010 and 2013 had been in low pay 
sectors whilst the jobs recovery had been underpinned by a large increase in generally low-paid 
self-employment (ONS, 2014b; TUC, 2013b)Ǥ ǡ    Ǯ ǯ
between private and public sector workers, the government took advantage of this situation of 
low pay growth in order to further retrench the conditions of workers in those sectors which for 
a short period of time had been insulated from the worst of the economic downturn. In other 
circumstances, initiating a period of sustained public sector pay retrenchment may have been 
difficult. Real wage decline across the private sector was again skilfully exploited by the 
Coalition, allowing it to mobilise support for its programme of public sector retrenchment      Ǯ ǯ    
subordinate social groups.   
 After a brief interregnum, pay in the private sector began to grow faster than pay in the 
public sector from 2010 to 2014 (Cribb et al., 2014; Grimshaw & Rubery, 2015). Projections 
from the OBR suggested that this dynamic is set to continue into the future (Cribb  et al., 2014: 
1).  These ǯinterventions into public sector employment relations therefore embodied 
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      Ǯ  ǯǤ  were indicative of a broader strategy to 
systematically de-privilege public sector employment within the emergent regime of UK 
capitalism. ǡ     Ǯ ǯ      
regard. As Jessop and his collaborators argued in relation to Thatcherism, Ǯ ǯ 
strategies, Ǯaim first, to expand the numbers of those in the privileged nation in areas where its 
privileges are well entrenched... and second, to widen the scope of their privilegesǯ (Jessop et al., 
1988: 179). In other words, although Ǯǯstrategies are limited in the sense that they 
direct material concessions towards  Ǯǯ   ǡ    ǮǯǤ
T    Ǯ ǯ legitimation strategy in support of its public sector 
retrenchment programme therefore fulfilled both short and long-term political objectives for 
the senior partners in the Coalition. In the short term, it allowed the government to justify an 
unprecedented period of public sector wage retrenchment whilst displacing blame for this    ǮǯǤ    ǡ ǡ 
popular base   Ǯǯlism in the future - a 
situation which, naturally, would favour the Conservatives.   
Conclusion  
This article began from the premise that the advanced capitalist state should be 
conceived as a site of distributional agency. On the one hand, policymakers are systematically 
driven to secure the conditions for continued economic growth over time. Accordingly, we can 
identify distinctive accumulation strategies deployed by policymakers which seek to bolster and 
sustain particular growth models within different national contexts. On the other hand, 
policymakers are driven to maintain a popular base of support and the legitimation of the 
prevailing social order whilst in officeǤ ǯ an attempt to realise this objective 
through actively shaping and discursively constructing underlying distributional trends. These 
interventions in turn give rise to distinctive ǤǮǯ
23 
 
to secure an expansive base of popular support through channelling concessions to the social ǢǮǯǡǡ   Ǯ ǯ    Ǥ   
framework, the article has advanced a distinctive interpretation of the political economy of the 
Coalition government throughout the post-crisis conjuncture.  A number of conclusions can 
accordingly be drawn.  
By 2015, the Coalition had effectively re-established the UKǯ - Ǯ-ǯ
growth model. However, amidst this continuity there has also been discernible shift within post-
crisis UK capitalism. Between 2008 and 2015, rapid and unprecedented real wage stagnation 
(temporarily) reduced the incomes of wage earners and private sector workers relative to 
welfare claimants and public sector workers respectively. Whilst real wage decline and falling 
living standards on this scale might in other circumstances have provoked a legitimation crisis 
for the state, the Coalition strategically transformed this deflationary context into a political 
asset. It discursively constructed the temporary protection of public sector pay packets and 
(inflation-adjusted) welfare payments as an unjust and unsustainable aberration in a context of 
real wage decline. On these grounds, the Coalition effectively entrenched a series of Ǯ
antagonismsǯ  wage earners/welfare claimants on the one hand and private/public 
sector workers on the other. In Ǯǯmation strategy, the Coalition 
effectively deflected blame for the palpable failures of its own regressively redistributive 
economic programme whilst imposing significant loses on broad swathes of the population 
(Green & Lavery, 2015).  
This analysis has important implications for how we might conceptualise post-crisis 
capitalism in the UK. ǯ pre-crisis Ǯǯ growth model incubated a series 
of structural weaknesses Ȃ in particular a reliance on private debt expansion to sustain 
aggregate demand Ȃ which left the country peculiarly exposed to the 2008 financial crash 
(Christensen et al., 2016a). However, this growth model was complemented and stabilised by 
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large expansions in public expenditure throughout the pre-crisis conjuncture.  ǯǮ ǯ legitimation strategy drove-up spending on public services, increased state-led 
employment and redistributed resources to subordinate social groups through the tax and 
benefit system. T ǯ    Ǯ ǯ   represented a 
fundamental break with this Ǯǯ   . As such, those flanking 
mechanisms which had temporarily stabilised finance-led growth throughout the pre-crisis 
conjuncture were fatally undermined under the Coalition. A series of imbalances and 
weaknesses therefore endure at the heart of UK capitalism. Almost a decade on from the global 
financial crisis, these weaknesses are likely to continue to generate further instabilities and 
dysfunctions as the UK enters into the next phase of its post-crisis social and economic 
development.    
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 The Coalition government consisted of a formal partnership between the Conservative Party and the 
Liberal Democrats, with the latter as junior partners. The Coalition government endured throughout the 
2010 to 2015 parliament. 
3 The Ǯ- ǯ       ? ?92 and 2007 when the UK economy 
underwent a period of modest but sustained low inflationary growth.  
5 The post-crisis conjuncture refers to the period between 2008 and 2015. The Coalition government was 
in power for the majority of this period, from May 2010 Ȃ May 2015.  
7 Ǯǯ legitimation stratǯǮǯ
projects (Jessop et al., 1988: 87). It is important to note that the ǮǯǤǡ  Ǯǯ  denotes a paternalist ideology and 
political economy which         Ǯǯ   , 
incorporating UK subjects into a unifying programme often through (limited) redistributive social and 
economic policies (Gamble, 2014, p. 16). ǡǮǯ ǲ
support of strategically significant sectors of the population and to pass the costs of the project to other 
sectorsǳ (Jessop, 1990: 211). The ǮOne Nationǯ/ǯTwo Nationsǯ distinction therefore embodies a useful 
metaphor through which we can distinguish between distinct political projects in different historical 
periods.  
8 It is worth noting that median earnings have lagged behind labour productivity increases in the UK since 
the early 1990s (The Resolution Foundation 2012: 21). Real wage growth has also consistently slowed 
over recent decades, with average annual increases of 1.2 per cent in the 2000s compared to 2.9 per cent 
in the 1970s and 1980s (ONS, 2014a, p. 3). Indeed, between 2003 and 2008, earnings growth flat-lined for 
those in the bottom half of the income distribution, despite economic growth over this period of 11 per 
cent (Plunkett, 2011, p. 10) This relative stagnation in real wages was a key driver of credit growth 
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amongst low income households in the pre-crisis conjuncture (Montgomerie & Büdenbender, 2014). 
However, it is important to emphasise that real wages declined to an unprecedented extent during the 
period under review, namely between 2008 and 2015. On average, real wages fell by 10 per cent 
throughout this period, meaning that the UK experienced the largest real terms wage cut of any European 
economy with the exception of Greece (TUC, 2016).  Furthermore, this dynamic is projected to continue 
into the future, in particular as sterling depreciation erodes consumer spending power in the aftermath of 
the EU referendum (Carney, 2016, p. 17). The construction and political management of continuing 
pressures on real wages within the UK therefore represents a crucial area for future research.  
9 A number of long-Ǯǯwithin UK capitalism. First, from a 
longue durée perspective, the UK economy has long incubated a large, open and politically powerful 
financial centre concentrated within the City of London (Anderson, 1964; Overbeek, 1989). The 
dominance of the City and its intersection with key institutions of the UK state, including the Treasury 
and the Bank of England, has at key moments undermined the development of the UKǯ  
(Ingham, 1984). In turn, this has rendered the UK susceptible to large deficits in its tradeable goods sector 
and to entrenched patterns of uneven spatial development (Coates, 2014; Gardiner et al., 2013). Second,    Ǯ-termǯ   ǡ since the late 1980s the dominance of the ǯ financial 
sector has increased ǯindustrial base has declined further still (Coates, 2014). This process 
has been associated with rising levels of income inequality and an erosion of the Ǯ ǯ
(Stockhammer, 2016). Both of these distributional dynamics make destabilising bouts of credit expansion 
likely and undermine effective demand formation. In addition, growth in low productivity service sectors 
has compounded low levels of output growth across the UK economy and further eroded real wages and 
domestic demand formation. Together, these structural weaknesses render the UK highly susceptible to 
anaemic per capita growth, high levels of inequality and recurrent financial crises (Christensen et al., 
2016). A programme capable of reversing these long-term structural weaknesses would require a 
fundamental shift in the growth strategy deployed by UK policymakers, a restructuring of the institutional 
architecture of the UK state and the mobilisation of social and political forces capable of sustaining a 
programme of radical economic restructuring and sustained wealth redistribution. For an indicative 
outline of what one such programme may look like, see: (Hay, 2013c).   
13          Ǯǯ    ǡ     
interchangeably with the term Ǯǯ	(Block, 1981) 
14 Ǯǯǲ ǳ (Block, 1981, p. 48)Ǥ    ǡ        Ǯre ǯ             ǡ
including the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and Cabinet Office, central government departments and the ǤǮǯ
provides one lens through which to conceptualise political strategy within advanced capitalist societies. 
The strategic orientation of other state agencies and civil society groupings is of course a further crucial 
area through which state strategy is mediated, organised and implemented. An analysis of these 
institutional complexes is, however, beyond the scope of the present study.  
15 For instance, in the aftermath of the 2008 crash, policymakers regularly equated the government 
balance sheet with that of a household budget, building support for austerity programmes which in fact 
imposed palpable costs on broad swathes of the population (Stanley, 2016). 
17 For example, the Thatcher government heavily subsidised the purchase of the council housing stock 
whilst the Coalition government reduced the cost of accessing mortgage credit for prospective ǮǯǤ 
19    ǡ       ǯ        
increase the cost of credit for borrowers.  
20 This argument is substantiated below.  
21 In the first two years of its first parliamentary term, New Labour pursued a tight fiscal policy, such that 
public spending fell from 41% of GDP in 1997 to 37.7% in 2000 over this period (Driver & Martell 2006: 
75). However, having avoided a run on Sterling upon assuming office, New Labour then transitioned 
towards an expansionary public spending programme from its second term onwards. It is from this point 
onwards that New LabourǯǮǯǤ It could be objected Ǯǯ. It is beyond the scope of this study to conclusively 
answer this question. Nonetheless, there is clear evidence from New Labour strategy and policy 
documents that public expenditure expansion was a key element in the political strategy of the New 
Labour leadership. For example, Labour placed ǮǯǮǯ
the heart of its 2001 election campaign (Geddes & Tonge, 2002, p. 7). Similarly, Cabinet minister Liam 
26 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Byrne wrote in the aftermath of the 2005 election that, ǲ      
achievements of combining sustained economic stability with the highest-ever levels of investment in 
public services. Labour has been re-elected with a strong cross-class appeal across all of the regions. The 
challenge ǳ (Byrne, 2005: 3).     
22 This represented a far steeper decline in real wages than was the case with the recessions of the early 
1980s and 1990s, when three years after each recession wages had increased by 5 and 10 per cent 
respectively (IFS, 2013: 5).  
23 For example, while total government expenditure amounted to £695 billion in 2011-12, £242 billion of    Ǯ ǯǡ           
pensions (Burton, 2013: 2). 
24 In the June 2010 Budget, for example, one third of the savings proposed by the Coalition were to be 
achieved through cuts to spending on welfare (HM Treasury, 2010b: 16). The October 2010 Spending 
Review set-out further welfare cuts of £7 billion per year over the course of the parliament (Ferry & 
Eckersley, 2012: 19). 
25 In light of electoral considerations, the government chose to protect the value of old age pensions over ǡ Ǯ ǯ 
year-on-year by which ever had the highest value out of earnings or inflation (Gamble, 2014: 12). Since 
pensions account for approximately half of the total welfare bill, this meant that large welfare savings had 
to be found elsewhere (IFS, 2014c). 
27 Over this period, the gini co-efficient fell from 0.36 to 0.34 
28 For example, in his 2014 Budget Speech, Osborne pointed- ǡ Ǯ    ? ?ǯǡǯ ? ? ? ?
Cameron argued that the fall in income inequality demonstrated that the Conservatives were committed Ǯǯ(Cameron, 2013; Osborne, 2014b). 
29 Ǯǯg benefit, tax credits and pension credit. 
30 I ? ? ? ?	ǡǮon-going cuts to benefits and tax credits [will] reduce incomes towards the 
bottom... income inequality may well return to its pre-ǯ(IFS, 2014b: 
56). 
31              ǯ   
programme.  
 
